

CHAPTER 44

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, INTEGRATION, AND SYNCHRONIZATION

FY 2005 SENIOR OFFICER LEGAL ORIENTATION COURSE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	PURPOSE OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE).....	1
III.	STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (SROE).....	2
IV.	CONCEPT OF SELF DEFENSE	3
V.	SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT	7
VI.	INTRODUCTION TO RAMP.....	8
VII.	TRAINING BY BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM	16
VIII.	ROE TRAINING IN THE FUTURE	19
IX.	CONCLUSION	20
X.	REFERENCES.....	20
XI.	APPENDIX A	22

**MAJ FRANCISCO A. VILA
FY 2005**

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, INTEGRATION, AND SYNCHRONIZATION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objectives.

1. Understand the purpose of having rules of engagement and what factors influence their creation.
2. Become familiar with the structure of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE), CJCSI 3121.01A, 15 January 2000.
3. Understand the different types of self-defense.
4. Understand the elements of self-defense.
5. Understand how supplemental measures are used IAW the SROE.
6. Recognize the need for training Soldiers on the ROE and various methodologies for doing so.

II. PURPOSE OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

- A. “Rules of Engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE.” Joint Pub 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- B. Functions of ROE: As a practical matter, ROE perform three functions:
1. Provide guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense to deployed units on the use of force;
 2. Act as a control mechanism for the transition from peacetime to combat operations; and
 3. Provide a mechanism to facilitate planning.
- C. Influences of ROE: Political; Military; and Legal.

III. STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (SROE)

- A. Purpose: “to provide implementation guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. In the absence of superseding guidance, the SROE establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. force commanders in the event of military attack against the United States and during all military operations, contingencies, terrorist attacks, or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
- B. Structure.
 - 1. Short covering instruction, with actual content in the Enclosures.
 - 2. Enclosure A: Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces. General, unclassified discussion of concepts and terms. It is “intended to be used as a coordination tool with U.S. allies for the development of combined or multinational ROE consistent with [the] ROE.” (SEE APPENDIX A, *infra*).
 - 3. Numerous classified Enclosures, some with Appendices, treat the concepts discussed in the unclassified Enclosure A in greater depth, or deal with the ROE applicable to specific mission areas.
 - 4. Enclosure J: Supplemental Measures.
 - a) Includes an extensive listing of specific ROE measures that may be used as required for mission accomplishment.
 - b) Also includes message formats to be used in requesting and authorizing supplemental ROE, and examples.
 - 5. Enclosure K: Combatant Commander’s Theater-Specific ROE. When promulgated, includes additional guidance applicable within a Combatant Commander’s Area of Responsibility.
 - 6. Enclosure L: Rules of Engagement Process. This Unclassified enclosure “provides guidelines for incorporating ROE development into the crisis action planning (CAP) and deliberate planning processes by commanders and staffs at all levels.” It also discusses the ROE Planning Cell. Such a cell is the responsibility of the J-3 (generally when engaged in CAP) or J-5

(generally when engaged in deliberate planning), with the assistance of the Staff Judge Advocate. (SEE APPENDIX A, *infra*).

7. Glossary. Contains useful definitions.

C. Applicability. Guidance for U.S. forces:

1. In the event of military attack on the United States.
2. During all military operations, contingencies, terrorist attacks, or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, including Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas, U.S. possessions, and U.S. territories.
3. Exceptions:
 - a) When the SROE are superseded by higher guidance.
 - b) Multinational Force (MNF): if U.S. forces are assigned to the operational control of an MNF, they will comply with the MNF ROE if authorized by the National Command Authorities (NCA). The self-defense concepts discussed in the SROE will always be applicable.
 - c) Units under the operational control of the USCG apply portions of the USCG use of force doctrine. The self-defense concepts discussed in the SROE will always be applicable.

D. Responsibility. The President and Secretary of Defense approve all ROE for US forces. The J-3 (Current Operations) is responsible for ROE maintenance.

E. Intent. These SROE are intended to:

1. Implement the right of self-defense, which is applicable worldwide to all echelons of command.
2. Provide guidance governing the used of force consistent with mission accomplishment.

IV. CONCEPT OF SELF DEFENSE

- A. Self defense is treated generally in Enclosure A.
- B. ROE Mantra. “THESE RULES DO NOT LIMIT A COMMANDER’S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS AVAILABLE AND TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION IN SELF DEFENSE OF THE COMMANDER’S UNIT AND OTHER U.S. FORCES IN THE VICINITY.”
- C. Key concepts.
 - 1. Self defense.
 - a) Unit self defense: Defense of a particular unit of U.S. forces, including elements or personnel thereof, and other U.S. forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or hostile intent.
 - (1) Vicinity: generally, the reach of the available weapon systems.
 - (2) Individual self defense:
 - (a) A subset of unit self defense.
 - (b) Individual’s right to defend himself and others on the vicinity.
 - (c) Commanders must ensure that individuals understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self defense.
 - (d) An individual’s right of self-defense may be subject to appropriate superior orders.
 - b) National self defense: Defense of the U.S., U.S. forces, and in certain circumstances, U.S. citizens and their property, and U.S. commercial assets from hostile acts or hostile intent.
 - (1) Responsibility for HN national protection resides with the HN unless the HN unable or unwilling to do so.
 - (2) Collective self-defense: defense of designated non-U.S. forces, foreign nationals, and their property.

- (a) Subset of National self defense.
- (b) Authority to exercise collective self-defense retained by the NCA.

2. Necessity and Proportionality.

- a) The application of force in self-defense requires the following two elements:
 - (1) Necessity: exists when a hostile act occurs or a demonstration of hostile intent.
 - (2) Proportionality: force used to counter a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all facts known to the commander at the time.
- b) The requirements of **necessity** and **proportionality** will be the basis for the judgment of the commander as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
- c) The use of force is normally a measure of last resort. Attempts should be made to control the situation without the use of force.
- d) If force is necessary, the nature, duration and scope of the response should not exceed that required to decisively counter the hostile act or intent.
- e) Deadly force (attack to disable or destroy): authorized when such action is the only prudent means by which the hostile act or intent can be prevented or terminated.

3. Actions in Self-Defense: The following guidelines apply for individual, unit, national, or collective self-defense.

- a) Attempt to De-escalate the situation.
- b) Use proportional force—which may include nonlethal weapons—to control the situation.

- c) Attack to disable or destroy.
- d) Examples of mnemonics – the two commonly used mnemonics to facilitate training are “5 S” and “VEWPRIK”.
 - (1) “5 S”: **S** (Shout – verbal persuasion); **S** (Show - force); **S** (Shove); **S** (Shoot – warning shot, if operationally viable); and **S** (Shoot)
 - (2) “VEWPRIK”: **V** (Verbal Warning); **E** (Exhibit Weapon); **W** (Warning Shot, if operationally viable); **P** (Pepper Spray, if authorized); **R** (Rifle Butstroke); **I** (Injure with Bayonet); and **K** (Kill with Fire)
 - (3) Certain individual measures above may not be operationally sound given the mission. Notwithstanding, the use of the mnemonic is intended to facilitate training so that the individual Soldier understands the how to respond to a hostile act or a demonstration intent. These mnemonics should never replace training.
- 4. Hostile Force: generic term applied to any force (civilian, paramilitary, or military) that has committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
 - a) Declared hostile force: once declared hostile by appropriate authority, U.S. forces need not observe a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent before engaging. Basis of the engagement shifts from conduct to status.
 - b) Hostile force can be engaged even where not involved in hostile activity. For example, unarmed troops in the mess hall behind their lines are a legitimate target if they have been declared hostile.
- 5. Hostile Act: an attack or use of force against U.S. forces. Also includes force used to impede or preclude the mission or duties of U.S. forces.
- 6. Hostile Intent: The threat of imminent use of force. Also includes the threat of force used to impede or preclude the mission or duties of U.S. forces. Hostile intent is fact-specific. Although there is guidance throughout the classified portions of the SROE pertaining to the factors that may constitute evidence of hostile intent in various situations, the ultimate decision rests with the commander against whom the potential hostile intent is being demonstrated.

V. SUPPLEMENTAL MEASURES AND MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

- A. Supplemental measures are issued, as necessary, for mission accomplishment. In many cases, the base-line concepts established in the SROE are sufficient guidance to the operational commander, and supplemental measures will not be promulgated.
- B. Supplemental measures may **not** a limit the inherent right and obligation of self defense. For example, assume that in a particular operation there is a supplemental measure restricting the use of crew-served weapons. The commander must observe this restriction while accomplishing the mission. However, if the commander needs to defend his unit (because his unit has become the object of either hostile intent or a hostile act), he may employ crew-served weapons if they are otherwise a necessary and proportional response.
- C. Supplemental measures may be requested by commanders at any level.
- D. Appendices to Enclosure J contain a list of standardized measures from which individual measures may be selected
 - 1. Lists are grouped by the authority (NCA, Combatant Commander, subordinate commanders) who may authorize the particular measure.
 - 2. Those measures which are reserved to the NCA or Combatant Commander are generally restrictive in nature. That is, they relate to an action, operation, or weapon system that must be affirmatively approved for use before a field commander may execute or utilize them.
 - 3. The remainder of the supplemental measure (those that may be approved by subordinate commanders) are permissive in nature. That is, a commander may utilize a particular tactic or weapon system unless he is told that he cannot do so. In some cases, a supplemental measure from this series may be used to authorize a particular tactic or weapon system when it is necessary to clarify its use, or to authorize something that had previously been restricted.
 - 4. Spares are included for novel measures.
 - 5. Supplemental measure numbers and text are unclassified when referenced separately, but are at least Confidential when the two are linked.

- E. ROE requests rise through the chain of command to the appropriate approval authority. Intermediate commanders may disapprove supplemental measure requests.
- F. ROE Message Formats.
 - 1. Contained in Appendix F to Enclosure J.
 - 2. Messages are classified at least Confidential.
 - 3. All requests and approvals should be serialized by unit. This is especially important for JTF and higher headquarters which are promulgating/approving ROE. For example, a unit which received CINC ROE Approval Serial 005 should ensure that they are in possession of Approval Serials 001-004 (unless the latest message is a total restatement of all previously approved ROE).
 - 4. Requests for supplemental ROE should *always* include the justification for the request.

VI. INTRODUCTION TO RAMP

- A. "A Matter of Training Not Lawyering." See generally, Mark S. Martins, *Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training Not Lawyering*, 143 MIL L. REV. 3 (1994).
- B. The Legislative Model.
 - 1. Problems in creation.
 - a) Unrealistic assumption that leaders can create ROE the way legislators create law.
 - b) "Overpopulation." Rules undergo revision by as many as nine levels of command.
 - c) Multiple ROE cards for same set of rules, inconsistency between units, "countless and changing shapes, colors, and flavors."

- d) Only constant, self-defense boilerplate.
2. Problems of interpretation.
- a) Unrealistic assumption that Soldiers can interpret ROE the same way governments can interpret laws.
 - b) No system of rules can ever eliminate all inappropriate uses or failures to use force.
 - (1) Troops respond too timidly.
 - (a) "Toss the willing firers out of an action and there can be no victory." S.L.A. MARSHALL, *MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE PROBLEM OF BATTLE COMMAND IN FUTURE WAR* 56-57 (1978).
 - (b) Many infantrymen in World War II did not fire their weapons even when confronted by hostile enemy forces. *Id.*
 - (2) Troops respond too aggressively.
 - (a) "Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes." William Prescott at the Battle of Bunker Hill, June 17, 1775.
 - (b) ROE is not a four-letter word.
 - (3) Not a substitute for proper training in fire discipline.
3. Problems in Enforcement.
- a) Poor dissemination of the facts surrounding criminal allegations.
 - b) Soldiers and media may believe that prosecution will follow every decision to fire.
 - c) Turns military doctrine into legal doctrine.
4. Problems in Land Force Doctrine.

- a) No real doctrine on training ROE.
 - b) Hard to train at the last minute.
- 5. Neglect of Cognitive and Environmental Dimensions.
 - a) Harsh environment unlike civil society.
 - b) Often ROE briefed not trained.

C. Curative Approach.

- 1. Best prescription for improving decision making under stressful situations is training.
 - a) "Suspended agony."
 - b) Law Enforcement.
 - (1) Technology, role-play.
 - (2) Rules never change.
- 2. Adopt a training model of Land Force ROE.
 - a) Pass out rules far in advance of operation.
 - b) Key core concepts never change, predictability.
 - (1) Flexibility through structure of alert conditions.
 - (2) Flexibility through supplements.
- 3. Internalized principles rather than external written texts.
 - a) Not like interpreting the tax code.
 - b) Decision time reduced.

4. No criminalization of violations of the rules except for those that go beyond a good faith interpretation.
5. Comprehensive system for organizing key principles.

D. RAMP

1. The source rules.
 - a) **R**eturn fire with aimed fire. Return force with force. You always have the right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.
 - b) **A**nticipate attack. Use force first if, but only if, you see clear indicators of hostile intent.
 - c) **M**easure the amount of force that you use, if time and circumstances permit. Use only the amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.
 - d) **P**rotect with deadly force only human life, and property designated by your commander. Stop short of deadly force when protecting other property.
2. The RAMP rules are default settings based on the core functional areas of the SROE, self-defense, proportionality, and military necessity.
 - a) Especially beneficial where the OPLAN/ORDER is received just hours before execution.
 - b) In the event a Soldier forgets the specific rules, application of RAMP will generally cause compliance with most specific ROE systems.
 - c) A "key word" or "mnemonic device" to be used as a means of organizing the rules in memory for quick retrieval during stressful situations.
 - (1) SPORTS and the M-16, METT-T, SALUTE.
 - (2) Soldiers accustomed to the key word approach.

- (3) Experts say assists in memorization and recollection.
- 3. Standards with which leaders can supervise "judgmental" type training.
- 4. Core set of rules which can be supplemented to fit the actual mission specific ROE.
 - a) Anticipate attack, for example, could be supplemented to indicate that hostile intent is to be presumed where a crew served weapon is manned.
 - b) **Protect property** could be supplemented to include using deadly force to protect weapons and ammunition.
- E. ROE Alert Conditions (ROECON).
 - 1. Ten functional types of ROE.
 - a) Type I - Hostility Criteria.
 - b) Type II - Scale of Force/Challenging Procedure.
 - c) Type III - Protection of Property and Foreign Nationals.
 - d) Type IV - Weapons Control Status/Alert Conditions.
 - e) Type V - Arming Orders.
 - f) Type VI - Approval to Use Weapons Systems.
 - g) Type VII - Eyes on Target.
 - h) Type VIII - Territorial or Geographic Restraints.
 - i) Type IX - Restrictions on Manpower.
 - j) Type X - Restrictions on Point Targets and Means of Warfare.
 - 2. RAMP embodies only the core rules, depicted in functional areas I through III.

3. ROECON is a system whereby commanders may use all ten types of ROE in complex combined arms teams operations.
- F. ROECON's are established and incorporated in the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).
1. ROECON GREEN.
 - a) Applies when no discernible threat of hostile activity exists.
 - b) Places forces in a routine security posture (SROE).
 - c) Involves minimal arming and protection of only the force and key facilities.
 2. ROECON AMBER.
 - a) Applies when a discernible threat of hostile activity, but not justifying ROECON RED.
 - b) Does not generally apply where higher headquarters has formally identified a hostile force.
 - c) Provides for arming of additional key personnel, establishment of roadblocks or barriers, security patrols, and increased availability of ordinance.
 3. ROECON RED.
 - a) Applies when an actual attack on U.S. forces occurs, a threat of imminent attack exists, or higher headquarters has formally identified a hostile force in theater.
 - b) Directs the force to continue the protection measures detailed in the lower ROECON's while arming all personnel and lowering the levels of approval authority on certain weapons systems.
 - c) Provides specific hostility criteria.
 4. May have preprinted ROE cards for each ROECON, organized in RAMP format.

G. Standard Formats for ROE annexes.

1. Each division prepares an ROE annex for every contingency plan that contributes to the unit's mission essential task list (METL).
2. Build on and reinforce RAMP and ROECON's.
3. Can "tailor" using preestablished ROECONS and RAMP.
 - a) Optional Measures.
 - b) Format rules to Soldiers based on RAMP.
 - c) ROE Matrix.
 - (1) Chart used to indicate levels of authority required for use of particular weapons systems.
 - (2) Matrix may change with ROECON.

H. Other recommendations.

1. Keep the RAMP and ROECON's unclassified while classifying the ROECON level.
2. Mastery of RAMP should be a battle task.
 - a) A task which must be accomplished by a subordinate unit if the next higher is to accomplish its METL.
 - b) Command climate the key.
 - c) A critical individual task monitored and graded by NCO's.
3. Training Scenarios.
 - a) Experience is the best trainer.
 - b) Training is the answer for shortfalls in experience.

- c) "It was stated time and time before us that when it comes to training on the ROE, briefings and lectures are insufficient. The training has to be ingrained and instinctive, so that the Soldier is able to react." *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair*, 2 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 616 (1997).
- 4. Scenarios can be found in articles, AAR's, and other sources.
 - a) Can use scenarios in classroom, then move to individual testing and finally STX's for small units.
 - b) Build into FTX and CPX scenarios.
- 5. Thoroughly integrate RAMP in training.
 - a) Level I: Classroom training for leaders and Soldiers by division operations lawyer. (Can be brigade judge advocate).
 - b) Level II: Individual common task training using RAMP. (Lawyer and legal NCO may draft task condition and standard, graded by unit personnel using check sheet).
 - c) Level III: Collective lane training by squad or platoon using RAMP. (Lawyer may draft scenario package, lane run by unit personnel. JAG may observe and offer suggestions or supply answers to the hard hypotheticals)
 - d) Level IV: Collective lane training by section, squad or platoon using RAMP supplemented by real world ROE. (Same as above).
 - e) Level V: Leader training using RAMP supplemented by real world mission-specific ROE. (Taught by Ops lawyer or brigade legal counsel).
- 6. RAMP rules are of no value without practice in an environment that simulates what the Soldiers may face
- I. Potential Concerns.
 - 1. **RAMP is not a substitute for ROE.**

- a) Training device for assisting Soldiers to understand, remember and apply ROE in a stress filled environment.
 - b) RAMP is supplemented by ROE and presented to Soldiers in RAMP format.
- 2. Too complicated?
- 3. Ignores nuances of specific units.
 - a) Not doctrine.
 - b) Develop own.
 - (1) ARMED.
 - (2) HAND SALUTE.
 - c) Combined and Joint Operations.

VII. TRAINING BY BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM

- A. During the planning sequence, Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) typically break off and plan their own part of the mission.
- B. Commander may have several non-organic support units assigned.
 - 1. Brigade Combined Arms Team may include non-direct support (DS) assets such as close air support (CAS), Army Aviation, Naval Gunfire (NGF), Corps Fire Support (FS) assets, Special Operations Forces (SOF), etc.
 - 2. The commander and staff may not be accustomed to working with these specialized "slice" units.
 - a) For example, Naval Gunfire has a very flat trajectory. Therefore, extremely accurate from a vertical standpoint but can over or undershoot a target. Danger close is 600 meters rather than the standard 400 meters.

- b) Air Force CAS may have a set of criteria for determining hostile intent different than Army aviators.
- C. In a mid to high intensity conflict, the large weapons systems are likely to inflict the greatest casualties and friendly fire incidents.
 - 1. On the modern battlefield, all of the unit's intelligence and fire support assets are used to locate, box in, block or fix the enemy so that the enemy can be destroyed with as little direct contact as possible.
 - 2. While the rifleman will always remain the focus, especially in OOTW, he will likely inflict a far smaller percentage of casualties in mid to high intensity conflicts than in the past.
- D. A great deal of attention is spent on training the rifleman, but what about the BOS?
- E. There is arguably a need to "train" or to integrate and synchronize the application of the ROE by BOS.
 - 1. Integration is the idea that all separate systems should work together; they should be on the same set of music.
 - 2. The BOS elements should synchronize the execution of the plan. They should insure that the timing of the application of the use of force enables the commander to maximize his use of combat power through surprise and mass producing a synergistic effect.
 - 3. Practicing this in peacetime will facilitate real world execution.
- F. No current doctrine on how to integrate and synchronize ROE.
 - 1. Joint Pub. 1-04, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Legal Support to Military Operations* (Draft Pub) introduces the concept of an ROE planning cell in the joint task force (JTF) environment.
 - a) At the JTF level, integrates key staff members during the planning phase, focusing on the impact of the ROE. Does not include all BOS.
 - b) Does not address integration and synchronization during the execution phases.

2. Consider creating an ROE planning cell at all levels of command.
 - a) Include all BOS elements.
 - b) Prior to mission execution, hold ROE integration and synchronization meetings.
 - (1) How will each BOS determine hostile intent? On the modern battlefield where enemy forces can be located beyond the capabilities of the human eye, what factors are going to be used?
 - (2) What types of optics will be used? During JUST CAUSE in Panama, an AC 130 unintentionally fired on U.S. ground forces. The soldiers had GLINT tape on their helmets. However, as the smoke of battle intensified, the AC 130 switched from infrared (IR) to thermal sights making it impossible to determine friend from foe.
 - (3) What type of munitions will be employed? If aviation assets are taking out an insurgent command and control bunker in a small village and there is a Special Forces team near by with eyes on target, could the bunker be taken out with a hellfire missile rather than aerial bomb in order to reduce the odds of fratricide and collateral damage?
 - (4) How is eyes on target interpreted? Satellite? Counter battery radar, Q36, Q37?

G. Situation Awareness.

1. Commander relies on the staff to keep him apprised of what is actually happening on the battlefield.
2. Judge Advocate can and should assist with situation awareness.
 - a) During operations, JAG is the person most likely to have time to act as an additional set of eyes.
 - (1) Is the engineer overlay accurate?

- (2) Has the maneuver BOS been adequately informed as to where the family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) has been placed before he begins offensive operations?
 - (a) Tube launched, delivered by aircraft or vehicle.
 - (b) Unmarked minefields.
 - (c) Dud factor.
 - (3) Does the fire support BOS know where SOF special reconnaissance (SR) teams are located?
 - (4) After offensive operations, has the G5 checked the overlay to determine where the unmarked FASCAM minefields are located?
- b) Assist the battle captain in logging and posting message traffic.

VIII. ROE TRAINING IN THE FUTURE

- A. Standardized v. Ad Hoc Training.
 - 1. "Training in the law of armed conflict is of critical importance to effective peacekeeping: it cannot continue to be provided in an ad hoc manner. A clear responsibility center must ensure that sufficient and effective training is conducted throughout the Canadian Forces." LTG J. Dangerfield, P. LaRose-Edwards & R. Weeks, *Non-Traditional Military Training for Canadian Peacekeepers*. Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada 73 (1997).
 - 2. "Ad Hoc supplements embedded training."
- B. Lane training realism limited by logistic, financial, environmental and coordination factors.
 - 1. Environmental, psychological and physical limitations are also benefits justifying live training.
 - 2. Difficult to set up if last minute training required.

- C. "Virtual" and "Constructive" computer simulations may be a valuable supplement to live training by adding another level of realism. LTC Michael Kelly & MAJ Mark Phillips, *The Application of Live, Virtual and Constructive Simulation to Training for Operations Other Than War*, Draft.
1. Purpose still to provide experiential rather than intellectual model.
 2. Cannot recreate the stench and noise of the real world, but may be able to raise the level of stress through sensory overload.
 3. Numerous permutations off single scenario.
 - a) Different languages.
 - b) Various environmental aspects, day v. night.
 - c) Pulls out a wallet, then pulls out a gun.
 4. Can be individual, squad or platoon sized.
 5. Experiential sensory level for the Soldier, command and control environment for the commander/BOS.
 6. If there is a centralized method of training, satellite-training centers could be linked to a central hub.
 7. Permits "distance learning."

IX. CONCLUSION

X. REFERENCES

- A. CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, 15 January 2000.
- B. CJCSI 3121.02 ,Rules on the Use of Force by DoD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States, 31 May 2000.
- C. DoD Instruction 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, 9 Dec 1998.

- D. DoD Instruction 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DoD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 25 February 1992.
- E. Joint Publication 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Legal Support to Military Operations (30 June 1998), Draft Copy.
- F. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS (1 March 2000)
- G. DEPT OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-5, OPERATIONS (14 June 1993).
- H. DEPT OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 101-5, STAFF ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS (31 May 1997)
- I. Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 3 (1994)
- J. CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, ROE TRAINING, Newsletter No. 96-6 (May 1996)
- K. CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING VIGNETTES, Newsletter No. 95-2 (Mar 1995)
- L. XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS RAMP/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TRAINING PACKAGE, AMEDMENT TO XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS AND FORT BRAGG REGULATION 350-41, TRAINING THE CORPS (Dec 1996)
- M. Operational Law Handbook, The Judge Advocate General's School.
- N. ROE Handbook, Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO).
- O. Deployed Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Judge Advocate Handbook, Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO).

XI. APPENDIX A

NOTE: THE PAGINATION OF THE FOLLOWING EXTRACT DOES NOT MATCH THE SROE.



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

J-3
DISTRIBUTION: A, C, S

CJCSI 3121.01A
15 January 2000

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES

Reference: See Enclosure M.

1. Purpose. This instruction establishes:
 - a. SecDef-approved standing rules of engagement (SROE) that implement the inherent right of self-defense and provide guidance for the application of force for mission accomplishment.
 - b. Fundamental policies and procedures governing action to be taken by US force commanders during all military operations and contingencies as specified in paragraph 3.
2. Cancellation. CJCSI 3121.01, 1 October 1994, is canceled.
3. Applicability. ROE apply to US forces during military attacks against the United States and during all military operations, contingencies, and terrorist attacks occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The territorial jurisdiction of the United States includes the 50 states, the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and Northern Marianas, US possessions, and US territories.
 - a. Peacetime operations conducted by the US military within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States are governed by use-of-force rules contained in other directives or as determined on a case-by-case basis for specific missions (see paragraph 4 of Enclosure H and Enclosure I).

b. Inclusion of NORAD. For purposes of this document, the Commander, US Element NORAD, will be referred to as a CINC.

4. Policy. See Enclosure A.

5. Definitions. Definitions are contained in the enclosures and the Glossary.

6. Responsibilities. The NCA approve ROE for US forces. The Joint Staff, Joint Operations Division (J-3), is responsible for the maintenance of these ROE.

a. The CINCs may augment these SROE as necessary to reflect changing political and military policies, threats, and missions specific to their areas of responsibility (AORs). When a CINC's theater-specific ROE modify these SROE, they will be submitted to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for NCA approval, if required, and referenced in Enclosure K of this instruction.

b. Commanders at every echelon are responsible for establishing ROE for mission accomplishment that comply with ROE of senior commanders and these SROE. The SROE differentiate between the use of force for self-defense and for mission accomplishment. Commanders have the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in the self-defense of their unit and other US forces in the vicinity. ROE supplemental measures apply only to the use of force for mission accomplishment and do not limit a commander's use of force in self-defense (see Enclosure A for amplification).

c. The two types of supplemental measures are -- those that authorize a certain action and those that place limits on the use of force for mission accomplishment. Some actions or weapons must be authorized either by the NCA or by a CINC. In all other cases, commanders may use any lawful weapon or tactic available for mission accomplishment unless specifically restricted by an approved supplemental measure. Any commander may issue supplemental measures that place limits on the use of force for mission accomplishment (see Enclosure J for amplification).

d. The CINCs distribute these SROE to subordinate commanders and units for implementation.

7. Procedures. Guidance for the use of force for self-defense and mission accomplishment is set forth in this document. Enclosure A, minus appendixes, is UNCLASSIFIED and intended to be used as a coordination tool with US allies for the development of combined or multinational ROE consistent with these SROE. The supplemental measures list in Enclosure J is organized by authorization level to facilitate quick reference during crisis planning. As outlined in paragraph 6 above, the CINCs will submit theater-specific SROE for reference in this instruction to facilitate theater-to-theater coordination.

8. Releasability. This instruction is approved for limited release. DOD components (to include the combatant commands) and other Federal agencies may obtain copies of this instruction through controlled Internet access only (limited to .mil and .gov users) from the CJCS Directives Home Page--<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel.htm>. The Joint Staff activities may access or obtain copies of this instruction from the Joint Staff LAN.

9. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt for all US force commanders and supersedes all other nonconforming guidance.

10. Document Security. This basic instruction is UNCLASSIFIED. Enclosures are classified as indicated.

HENRY H. SHELTON

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures:

- A -- Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces
 - Appendix A - Self-Defense of US Nationals and Their Property at Sea
 - Appendix B - Recovery of US Government Property at Sea
 - Appendix C - Protection and Disposition of Foreign Nationals in the Custody of US Forces
- B -- Maritime Operations
- C -- Air Operations
- D -- Land Operations
- E -- Space Operations
- F -- Information Operations
- G -- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- H -- Counterdrug Support Operations
- I -- Domestic Support Operations
- J -- Supplemental Measures
 - Appendix A - General Supplemental Measures
 - Appendix B - Supplemental Measures for Maritime Operations
 - Appendix C - Supplemental Measures for Air Operations
 - Appendix D - Supplemental Measures for Land Operations
 - Appendix E - Supplemental Measures for Space Operations
 - Appendix F - Message Formats and Examples
- K -- Combatant Commander's Theater-Specific ROE
- L -- Rules of Engagement Process
- M -- References
- GL-- Glossary

ENCLOSURE A

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES

1. Purpose and Scope

a. The purpose of these SROE is to provide implementation guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. In the absence of superseding guidance, the SROE establish fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US force commanders in the event of military attack against the United States and during all military operations, contingencies, terrorist attacks, or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, including the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and Northern Marianas, US possessions, and US territories. To provide uniform training and planning capabilities, this document is authorized for distribution to commanders at all levels and is to be used as fundamental guidance for training and directing their forces.

b. Except as augmented by supplemental ROE for specific operations, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures established herein remain in effect until rescinded.

c. US forces operating with multinational forces:

(1) US forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a multinational force will follow the ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by the NCA. US forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

(2) When US forces, under US OPCON or TACON, operate in conjunction with a multinational force, reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, US forces will operate under these SROE. To avoid misunderstanding, the multinational forces will be informed prior to US participation in the operation that US forces intend to operate under these SROE and to exercise unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. For additional guidance concerning peace operations, see Appendix A to Enclosure A.

(3) Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from international agreements: e.g., other coalition members may not be parties to treaties that bind the United States, or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party. US forces remain bound by US international agreements even if the other coalition members are not parties to these agreements and need not adhere to the terms.

d. Commanders of US forces subject to international agreements governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) retain the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate actions for unit self-defense.

e. US forces in support of operations not under OPCON or TACON of a US CINC or that are performing missions under direct control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other-USG departments or agencies (e.g., Marine Security Guards, certain special security forces) will operate under use-of-force policies or ROE promulgated by those departments or agencies. US forces, in these cases, retain the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in unit self-defense in accordance with these SROE.

f. US Naval units under USCG OPCON or TACON conducting law enforcement support operations will follow the use-of-force and weapons policy issued by the Commandant, USCG, but only to the extent of use of warning shots and disabling fire per 14 USC 637 (reference w). DOD units operating under USCG OPCON or TACON retain the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in unit self-defense in accordance with these SROE.

g. US forces will comply with the Law of War during military operations involving armed conflict, no matter how the conflict may be characterized under international law, and will comply with its principles and spirit during all other operations.

2. Policy

a. **These rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity.**

b. The goal of US national security policy is to preserve the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation and to maintain a stable international environment consistent with US national interests. US national security interests guide global objectives of deterring and, if necessary, defeating armed attack or terrorist actions against the United States to include US forces and, in certain circumstances, US nationals and their property, US commercial assets, persons in US custody, designated non-US forces, and foreign nationals and their property.

3. Intent. These SROE are intended to:

a. Implement the right of self-defense, which is applicable worldwide to all echelons of command.

b. Provide guidance governing the use of force consistent with mission accomplishment.

c. Be used in peacetime operations other than war, during transition from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict in the absence of superseding guidance.

4. CINCs' Theater-Specific ROE

a. CINCs may augment these SROE as necessary as delineated in subparagraph 6a of the basic instruction.

b. CINCs will distribute these SROE to subordinate commanders and units for implementation. The mechanism for disseminating ROE supplemental measures is set forth in Enclosure J.

5. Definitions

a. Inherent Right of Self-Defense. A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend that commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Neither these rules, nor the supplemental measures activated to augment these rules, limit this inherent right and obligation. At all times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality, as amplified in these SROE, will form the basis for the judgment of the on-scene commander (OSC) or individual as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.

b. National Self-Defense. Defense of the United States, US forces, and, in certain circumstances, US nationals and their property, and/or US commercial assets. National self-defense may be exercised in two ways: first, it may be exercised by designated authority extending protection against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent to US nationals and their property, and/or designated US commercial assets [in this case, US forces will respond to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent in the same manner they would if the threat were directed against US forces]; second, it may be exercised by designated authority declaring a foreign force or terrorist(s) hostile [in this case, individual US units do not need to observe a hostile act or determine hostile intent before engaging that force or terrorist(s)].

c. Collective Self-Defense. The act of defending designated non-US forces, and/or designated foreign nationals and their property from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unlike national self-defense, the authority to extend US protection to designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property may not be exercised below the NCA level. Similar to unit self-defense and the extension of US forces protection to US nationals and their property and/or commercial assets, the exercise of collective self-defense must be based on an observed hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

d. Unit Self-Defense. The act of defending a particular US force element, including individual personnel thereof, and other US forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

e. Individual Self-Defense. The inherent right to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend oneself and US forces in one's vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent is a unit of self-defense. Commanders have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective units understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense.

f. Elements of Self-Defense. Application of force in self-defense requires the following two elements:

(1) Necessity. Exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorists exhibits hostile intent.

(2) Proportionality. Force used to counter a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all facts known to the commander at the time (see Glossary for amplification).

g. Hostile Act. An attack or other use of force against the United States, US forces, and, in certain circumstances, US nationals, their property, US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property. It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel and vital US Government property (see Glossary for amplification).

h. Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US nationals, their property, US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property. Also, the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property (see Glossary for amplification).

i. Hostile Force. Any civilian, paramilitary, or military force or terrorist(s), with or without national designation, that has committed a hostile act, exhibited hostile intent, or has been declared hostile by appropriate US authority.

6. Declaring Forces Hostile. Once a force is declared hostile by appropriate authority, US units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force. The responsibility for exercising the right and obligation of national self-defense and as necessary declaring a force hostile is a matter of the utmost importance. All available intelligence, the status of international relationships, the requirements of international law, an appreciation of the political situation, and the potential consequences for the United States must be carefully weighed. The exercise of the right and obligation of national self-defense by competent authority is separate from and in no way limits the commander's right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense. The authority to declare a force hostile is limited as amplified in Appendix A of this Enclosure.

7. Authority to Exercise Self-Defense

a. National Self-Defense. The authority to exercise national self-defense is outlined in Appendix A of this Enclosure.

b. Collective Self-Defense. Only the NCA may authorize the exercise of collective self-defense.

c. Unit Self-Defense. A unit commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend the unit, including elements and personnel, or other US forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. In defending against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, unit commanders will use only that degree of force necessary to decisively counter the hostile act or demonstrated

hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of US forces (see subparagraph 8a of this enclosure for amplification).

d. Individual Self-Defense. Commanders have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective units are trained on and understand when and how to use force in self-defense.

8. Action in Self-Defense

a. Means of Self-Defense. All necessary means available and all appropriate actions may be used in self-defense. The following guidelines apply for individual, unit, national, or collective self-defense:

(1) Attempt to De-Escalate the Situation. When time and circumstances permit, the hostile force should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw, or cease threatening actions (see Appendix A of this Enclosure for amplification).

(2) Use Proportional Force -- Which May Include Nonlethal Weapons -- to Control the Situation. When the use of force in self-defense is necessary, the nature, duration, and scope of the engagement should not exceed that which is required to decisively counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of US forces or other protected personnel or property.

(3) Attack to Disable or Destroy. An attack to disable or destroy a hostile force is authorized when such action is the only prudent means by which a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent can be prevented or terminated. When such conditions exist, engagement is authorized only while the hostile force continues to commit hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent.

b. Pursuit of Hostile Forces. Self-defense includes the authority to pursue and engage hostile forces that continue to commit hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent.

c. Defending US Nationals, Property, and Designated Foreign Nationals

(1) Within a Foreign Nation's US-Recognized Territory or Territorial Airspace. The foreign nation has the principal responsibility for defending US nationals and property within these areas (see Appendix A of this Enclosure for amplification).

(2) At Sea. Detailed guidance is contained in Appendix A to Enclosure B.

(3) In International Airspace. Protecting civil aircraft in international airspace is principally the responsibility of the nation of registry. Guidance for certain cases of actual or suspected hijacking of airborne US or foreign civil aircraft is contained in CJCSI 3610.01, 31 July 1997, "Aircraft Piracy and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects."

(4) In Space. Military or civilian space systems such as communication satellites or commercial earth-imaging systems may be used to support a hostile action. Attacking third party or civilian space systems can have significant political and economic repercussions. Unless

specifically authorized by the NCA, commanders may not conduct operations against space-based systems or ground and link segments of space systems. Detailed guidance is contained in Enclosure E.

(5) Piracy. US warships and aircraft have an obligation to repress piracy on or over international waters directed against any vessel, or aircraft, whether US or foreign flagged and are authorized to employ all means necessary to repress piratical acts. For ships and aircraft repressing an act of piracy, the right and obligation of self-defense extends to persons, vessels, or aircraft assisted. If a pirate vessel or aircraft fleeing from pursuit proceeds into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or superjacent airspace of another country, every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the coastal state prior to continuation of the pursuit.

d. Operations Within or in the Vicinity of Hostile Fire or Combat Zones Not Involving the United States

(1) US forces should not enter, or remain in, a zone in which hostilities (not involving the United States) are imminent or occurring between foreign forces unless directed by proper authority.

(2) If a force commits a hostile act or exhibits hostile intent against US forces in a hostile fire or combat zone, the commander is obligated to act in unit self-defense in accordance with SROE guidelines.

e. Right of Assistance Entry

(1) Ships, or under certain circumstances aircraft, have the right to enter a foreign territorial sea or archipelagic waters and corresponding airspace without the permission of the coastal or island state to engage in legitimate efforts to render emergency assistance to those in danger or distress from perils of the sea.

(2) Right of Assistance Entry extends only to rescues where the location of those in danger is reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or territorial airspace to conduct a search.

(3) For ships and aircraft rendering assistance on scene, the right and obligation of self-defense extends to and includes persons, vessels, or aircraft being assisted. The right of self-defense in such circumstances does not include interference with legitimate law enforcement actions of a coastal nation. However, once received onboard the assisting ship or aircraft, persons assisted will not be surrendered to foreign authority unless directed by the NCA.

(4) Further guidance for the exercise of the right of assistance entry is contained in CJCS Instruction 2410.01A, 23 April 1997, "Guidance for the Exercise of Right of Assistance Entry."

ENCLOSURE L

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT PROCESS

1. Purpose and Scope. Developing and implementing effective ROE are critical to mission accomplishment. This enclosure provides guidelines for incorporating ROE development into the crisis action planning (CAP) and deliberate planning processes by commanders and staff at all levels. All supplemental measures not specifically requiring NCA or CINC approval (001-199) are available for use by commanders unless expressly withheld by higher authority.

2. ROE Development

a. General. ROE are an operational issue and must directly support the operational concept. Once assigned a mission, the commander and staff must incorporate ROE considerations into mission planning. Operations planning and ROE development are parallel and collaborative processes that require extensive integration and may require development and request of supplemental measures requiring NCA or CINC approval for mission accomplishment. The issues addressed throughout the planning process will form the basis for supplemental ROE requests requiring NCA or CINC approval in support of a selected course of action (COA). ROE development is a continuous process that plays a critical role in every step of CAP and deliberate planning. Normally, the Director for Operations (J-3) is responsible for developing ROE during CAP while the Director for Strategic Plans and Policies (J-5) develops ROE for deliberate planning. The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) assumes the role of principal assistant to the J-3 or J-5 in developing and integrating ROE into operational planning.

b. Task Steps. The following steps can be used to assist staffs in developing and implementing ROE during planning.

(1) Mission Analysis

(a) Review the SROE, including the CINC theater-specific ROE contained in Enclosure K.

(b) Review supplemental ROE measures already approved by higher headquarters, and determine existing constraints and restraints.

(c) Review higher headquarters planning documents for political, military, and legal considerations that affect ROE. Consider tactical or strategic limitations on the use of force imposed by:

1. Higher headquarters in the initial planning documents.
2. International law, including the UN Charter.
3. US domestic law and policy.
4. HN law and bilateral agreements with the United States.
5. For multinational or coalition operations:
 - a. Foreign forces ROE, NATO ROE, or other use of force policies.

b. UN resolutions or other mission authority.

(d) Desired End State. Assess ROE requirements throughout preconflict, deterrence, conflict, and postconflict phases of an operation. ROE should support achieving the desired end state.

(2) Planning Guidance

(a) Review commander's planning guidance for considerations affecting ROE development.

(b) Ensure ROE considerations derived from commander's planning guidance are consistent with those derived from initial planning documents.

(3) Warning Orders. Incorporate instructions for developing ROE in warning orders, as required. Contact counterparts at higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters, and establish the basis for concurrent planning.

(4) COA Development. Determine ROE requirements to support the operational concept of each proposed COA.

(5) COA Analysis

(a) Analyze ROE during the wargaming process. In particular, assess each COA to identify any ROE normally retained by a higher echelon (NCA, CINC) that must be delegated to subordinate commanders. Identify ROE required by decision and decisive points.

(b) Refine ROE to support synchronizing each phase of proposed COAs.

(6) COA Comparison and Selection. Consider ROE during the COA comparison process.

(7) Commander's Estimate. Identify NCA-level ROE required to support recommended COA.

(8) Preparation of Operations Order (OPORD).

(a) Prepare and submit requests for all supplemental ROE measures in accordance with Enclosure A. Normally, the OPORD should not be used to request supplemental measures.

(b) Prepare the ROE appendix of the OPORD in accordance with CJCSM 3122.03 (JOPES Volume II: Planning Formats and Guidance). The ROE appendix may include supplemental ROE measures that are already approved.

(c) Include guidance for disseminating approved ROE. Consider:

1. Developing 'plain language' ROE.

2. Creating ROE cards.
3. Issuing special instructions (SPINS).
4. Distributing ROE to multinational forces or coalitions.
5. Issuing ROE translations (for multinational forces or coalitions).

(9) ROE Request and Authorization Process. Commanders will request and authorize ROE, as applicable, in accordance with Enclosure A of this enclosure.

(10) ROE Control. Commanders and their staffs must continuously analyze ROE and recommend modifications required to meet changing operational parameters. The ROE process must anticipate changes in the operational environment and modify supplemental measures to support the assigned mission.

- (a) Ensure that only the most current ROE serial is in use throughout the force.
- (b) Catalog all supplemental ROE requests and approvals for ease of reference.
- (c) Monitor ROE training.

(d) Modify ROE as required. Ensure that a timely, efficient staff process exists to respond to requests for and authorizations of ROE changes.

3. Establish ROE Planning Cell. Commanders may use a ROE Planning Cell to assist in developing ROE. The following guidelines apply:

- a. The J-3 or J-5 is responsible for the ROE Planning Cell and, assisted by the SJA, developing supplemental ROE.
- b. ROE are developed as an integrated facet of crisis action and deliberate planning and are a product of the Operations Planning Group (OPG) or Joint Planning Group (JPG), or equivalent staff mechanism.
- c. ROE Planning Cell can be established at any echelon to refine ROE derived from the OPG or JPG planning and to produce ROE requests and/or authorizations.

- (1) The J-3 or J-5 is responsible for the ROE Cell.
- (2) The SJA assists the J-3 and J-5.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK